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Abstract
In disasters, and more so in catastrophes, one of
the most daunting problems to professional responders is gaining situational awareness. Unfortunately,
truly actionable information (intelligence) is missing
in the first days and even weeks of responding. Consequently, incomplete situational awareness brings
on a distorted common operating picture leading to
suboptimal direction of responses, so more lives are
lost, and more damage is inflicted. This study reports
on the challenges emergency responders faced in the
immediate aftermath of the 2014 massive landslide
near Oso, WA. Over a hundred agencies were involved in the response, which presented a huge coordination task for the incident command. This study
identifies and describes various challenges in the
early response and also discusses recommendations
on how to tackle and potentially mitigate the challenges identified in future responses.

1. Introduction
On March 22, 2014 the most massive landslide
(not attributable to volcanic activity) in the history of
the United States occurred near Oso, Washington. It
killed forty-three people as well as an unknown number of animals. It also destroyed over fifty residential
structures and cut off Washington State Route 530
(SR530) at a length of more than one mile.
After the immensity of the incident was understood, President Obama declared it a national disaster. The response and early recovery effort extended
for almost three months, and the SR530 only opened
to the public in late September, after it had been freed
from the mud cover and partly rebuilt in the worst
affected area. To this day, the debris field looks like a
moon landscape, and the affected local communities
recover only slowly.
A total of 119 agencies from all levels of government were involved in the response including the
National Guard, the Coast Guard, the State Emergency Management Division, FEMA Region X, Snohomish County, the Department of Natural Resources, EPA, among others as well as dozens of re-
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lief organizations. More than a thousand individuals
participated in the response effort.
Response efforts on this scale are extremely complex undertakings, and they require enormous managerial, operational, and tactical skills on part of the
responders. Responders use many traditional and
novel technologies to do their jobs. They have to rely
on effective information infrastructures to facilitate
what is called “situational awareness,” which then
can be formed into a so-called “common operating
picture.” In other words, accurate and reliable information is the most important and most scarce resource in early disaster response. A lack of situational
awareness leads to issues in the coordination of response units and presents challenges to the incident
command system, which is widely (and, for that matter, successfully) used in US disaster response. For
this study, first responders from several levels of
government were interviewed, among whom were the
local responders first on site, members of the Snohomish County Emergency Operating Center, the incident commanders, responders from neighboring municipalities and counties under mutual-aid agreement
as well as urban search and rescue teams (USAR),
the State Emergency Management Division (EMD),
the WA National Guard, and FEMA Region X.
The paper is organized as follows: First, the extant literature on disaster response and situation
awareness is reviewed. Then, the study’s research
questions are outlined, followed by the methodology
section. Next, the findings are presented succeeded
by a discussion of the insights from the findings. Finally, conclusions are conferred along with directions
for future research on the subject.

2. Literature Review
The mission-critical role of actionable and integrated information in disaster response has increasingly been emphasized in recent research ([10, 21,
24]). Shared situational awareness leading to a shared
common operating picture [9, 10, 17, 24] are considered foundational to agile, disciplined, and effective
emergency and disaster response [16]. However, the
larger the disaster the more agencies respond, and the
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more complex is the coordination of action [7, 18].
Gaining and maintaining shared situational awareness
in “the complex, heterogeneous emergency management structure” is seen as ”exceedingly difficult,”
and “the assumption that shared situational awareness
will be easily achieved are doomed to failure” [17, p.
1]. Endsley who laid the foundations to a theory of
situation awareness (SA) in the context of combat
aviation [8, 9] recently recognized an unaddressed
and vast research problem surrounding SA, in general, and shared SA, in particular, by pointing at a
“myriad of problems” with regard to “data overload,
poor integration of information to support comprehension and projection,...poor information representation, and inadequate flow of information…” [10, p.
164]. However, despite the obvious need for addressing these informational problems in SA few studies,
if any, were found, which incorporate an information
perspective.
The three levels of perception, comprehension,
projection in SA [9] are dynamically intertwined implicating level-specific and stakeholder-specific information needs, which require systematic study.
Furthermore, the information needs of disaster responders on each SA level lead to specific information behaviors [3]), which may vary individually as
well as for larger groups. Extreme event-related information needs and information behaviors in turn
entail SA level-specific and responder-specific information flows. These information flows and their
potential disruptions also need to be studied in detail.
The information perspective provides a sharp lens on
disaster-specific information needs, information behaviors, and information flows among and between
responders during an unfolding disaster.
The information perspective is a human actorand action-centric perspective. It is concerned with
technologies as the potential facilitators of information needs, behaviors, and flows, but not for their
own sake. Information and communication technologies (ICTs) have assumed increasingly important
roles in supporting and facilitating information behavior and information flows, in general. In disaster
management, they have become key elements [4, 18]
in providing high-quality, mission-critical, and timely
and actionable information, fulfilling the rapidly
changing ad-hoc information needs of first responders [18, 19, 26]), although they can also be the cause
for information overload, work overload, and other
stressors [10]. Information behavior and information
flows under disaster conditions depend on robust and
resourceful information infrastructures, which are
embedded in social structures and processes (including formal and informal organizational processes) as
their key elements [6, 22, 26].

3. Research Questions
The research questions that guide this exploratory
inquiry are targeted at narrowing the recognized gap
in the literature with regard to SA along the three
central information dimensions, which are (1) responders’ specific SA-related information needs,
which in turn lead to (2) certain SA-related information behaviors of disaster response teams (for example, in terms of seeking, collecting, or verifying information) as well as to (3) vertical and horizontal
SA-related information flows between and among
disaster response teams. This leads to the following
three compound research questions, all of which address the whats, hows, and whys, as well as the challenges in each informational dimension:
Research Question #1 (RQ#1):
What are specific SA-related challenges for disaster response teams on different levels of involvement, and what are specific challenges to meet the
information needs?
Research Question #2 (RQ#2):
What are specific SA-related information sharing challenges for disaster response teams, and what
are specific challenges to responders’ information
behaviors?
Research Question #3 (RQ#3):
What are other challenges in the context of acquiring and maintaining SA among and between disaster response teams, and what are specific SArelated challenges to responders’ information flows?

4. Method Section
Instrument and Coding Scheme. Based on the
conceptual framework of resilient information infrastructures (RIIs) [24] a semi-structured interview protocol was devised upfront, which covered six topical
areas of (1) management and organization, (2) technology, (3) governance, (4) information, (5) information infrastructure, and (6) RIIs/resiliency. A total of
thirty-six interview questions and probes were incorporated.
Sample. The sample was purposive [23] and included responders from nine different groups: the (1)
local responders, (2) County Emergency Operations
Center, (3) urban search and rescue teams, (4) WA
State (type-2) response teams, (5) responders from
neighboring jurisdictions under mutual aid agreements, (6) State Emergency Management Division,
(7) WA State Department of Transportation, (8) WA
State National Guard, and (9) Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), region X. A total of
31 individuals were interviewed.
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Data collection: Interviews were conducted in
person between September 2014 and March 2015 and
lasted between 55 to 261 minutes. One interview was
conducted via Skype video conferencing. All interviews were audio taped, transcribed, and coded by at
least two coders for analysis. During the interviews
also notes were taken and participant interaction was
observed and recorded. Moreover, other documents
such as after-action reports and press interviews were
collected, reviewed, and coded as appropriate.
Data analysis and coding: The initial codebook,
which was based on the aforementioned conceptual
RII framework, contained six category codes (one for
each topical area) and 134 sub-category codes. Additional codes were inductively introduced during data
collection, in individual coding sessions, and intercoder sessions [14, 15, 25, 27]. Since a codebook in a
hybrid approach of deductive and inductive analyses
[12] is designed to be open to extension, it ultimately
encompassed 151 sub-category codes in the six main
categories.
At least two researchers coded each transcript
and document by means of a cloud-based software
tool for qualitative and mixed-method data analyses
(Dedoose main versions 6 And 7, dedoose.com). The
coded data were compared one by one and demonstrated high inter-rater reliability.
The code frequency table revealed the highest
numbers of code applications in the areas of “management and organization” (2,219), “technology”
(968), and “information” (711). For the purpose of
the specific analysis on situational awareness-related
information needs, information behaviors, and information flows the code intersection represented by the
sub-codes of “situational awareness,” “address challenges of information sharing,” and “use of information and communication technologies for information
sharing” was selected, which produced 650 excerpts.
Excerpts, which were between two and three
paragraphs in length, were organized per responder
team and conceptually analyzed. Recurring themes
and main concepts were identified and named by
means of key phrases and keywords. These concepts/context clusters were transferred to the “canvas” of a cloud-based mapping tool (CMAP, version
6.01.01). The concepts/context clusters were inspected and sorted into topical “bins” or “baskets,” in
which chronological, logical, and other relationships
were identified. Relationship links between concepts/context clusters were established whenever evidence from the data supported that link.
Research team and processes. The research team
consisted of the principal investigator (PI) and more
than forty research assistants (RAs), both for-credit

and voluntary. The PI and RAs worked individually
and in small teams to transcribe, code, and conceptually/contextually analyze, and map the concepts. The
research team met weekly in person or online and
communicated via the research project site and the
project listserv as well as via individual face-to-face
and group meetings. All weekly meetings were
streamed and recorded, which kept the whole research team in sync over extended periods of time.

5. Findings
5.1 Ad research question #1 (responders’ specific SA-related challenges):
Gaining full situational awareness is acknowledged as one of the most vexing challenges to responders on all levels. This appeared to be no different in the case of the Oso/SR530 landslide response.
Responders were in urgent need of acquiring reliable
and accurate information on the extent and impact of
the landslide. However, several challenges to gaining
and maintaining SA were discovered across responder teams, predominantly during the first 24 to
72 hours into the incident. But even after 72 hours
several SA-related challenges persisted.
Almost all responder groups mentioned the lack
of sharing information in a timely fashion among responder groups during the early phases of the response, which in turn led to incomplete SA and a distorted common operating picture (COP). It appears
from the data that shared situational awareness in
terms of capturing the basic facts (and with it an initial shared COP) emerged only after 72 hours into the
incident, if not even later. Interviewees attributed this
delay in arriving at a shared SA to several intertwined
factors: (1) in a geography known for frequent mudslides, the term “mudslide” or even “landslide” in
early responder communications inadvertently
framed a mental model pointing at a far minor incident than the one at hand. It took ground zero responders quite some time to change their mental
model; however, also responders at County and EMD
levels initially worked under the regular “mudslide”
assumption. One responder remembered it with some
explicit verbiage,
So initially, it was like, hey, there’s a mudslide in Darrington, and it was like, so big
f***ing deal, there’s mudslides everywhere.
No, it’s a big one, yeah, OK, big f***ing
deal, it’s a big mudslide. And then it was like,
No, it’s a really f***ing big one. Oh, maybe,
we, you know, we might end up going to this.
So we asked our leadership.
(2) The local responders on the ground had only
a partial view onto the site of impact; on the Western
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(Oso) side responders initially even thought that the
slide might have come from the Southern hillsides.
Their view on the failed slope was blocked, whereas
the Eastern (Darrington) side responders had a clear
view on the slope, which, however, did not necessarily indicate a huge hillside failure from the angle and
distance of observation; as a result, initially responders on neither side understood the extent of the slide
and the large area impacted; rather than being separated by debris from each other by about 100 or 200
yards on the blocked and buried SR530 as they
thought, they were in fact about a mile apart from
each other. (3) County and other helicopters reached
the debris field as early as 35 minutes after the landslide had occurred and engaged in search and rescue
operations missing to systematically report back to
the base about what they saw. However, while the
aircrews clearly noticed the extent of the debris field,
they were unable to identify the conditions on the
ground, which differed substantially on the Western
and Eastern edges of the debris field. Said one interviewee,
On Monday <March 24, 2014–insertion by
authors> I don’t think everybody had a full
idea of the scope of the slide yet, where the
edges were. I know on Sunday they didn’t. It
blew me away that we had, I forget how many
helicopters in that initial response, and I’ve
heard it at a number of these debriefings
“Well, they were too busy doing rescues to
tell anybody what was going on.”
Another interviewee held,
It was all about information. And an ability to
articulate what you saw, and what you
thought you understood, as well as be able to
articulate the question: "What is really happening." I think that didn't get asked right
away. Because people were so focused on
what they know, or what they thought they
knew. It created a sense of tunnel vision almost for them.
And yet another responder affirmed,
And I didn’t fully probably, 100% understand
the enormity of it until I got out there and
walked it, and walked from one end to the
other in the mud and saw what our people
were up against. On day 5 I did that.
Although responders on the ground and in the air
separately knew essential elements of information
such as (1) affected area (aircrews), (2) characteristics of the debris on the Western side (Oso responders), as opposed to (3) different characteristics of the
debris on the Eastern side (Darrington responders),
these elements were not immediately integrated to

establish shared situational assessment, and subsequently, no shared common operating picture. One
interviewee stated,
I don’t think we had a central point for all
that information to be reported through, and
it kind of goes back to that thing we were
talking about—information from the field being collected at a single point at the incident
command post, being passed up to the EOC.
And then information that’s coming into the
EOC that we pass back down to the incident
command post, because it bypassed them.
Another interviewee said,
At the beginning, I mean, the estimates that
were coming from the Army Corps of Engineers and WSDOT were insane. Insanely low,
insanely high, there was nothing you could
believe, and so there was always this kind of
feeling of “We don’t know where we’re at.
We don’t know what we’re doing, we don’t
know what the impact is.”
According to interviewees from various teams,
communication and information sharing between the
local incident command posts, the County EOC,
which was not even activated to the highest level, and
the fully activated State EOC, particularly on day 1
and 2, but also into the first week of the response
were slow and incomplete, which prevented shared
situational awareness among response teams and the
development of a shared common operating picture
and coordinated incident action planning.
Since the slide had remained active for an extended period of time, and the thick debris in many
areas was wet and initially proved too dangerous for
extended ground operations, search and rescue by air
soon became the sole option. This, in turn, kept aircrews from systematically reporting to the ICP and
the EOC essential elements of information such as
the identified extent of the slide and the boundary of
the impacted area.
While on the day of the incident the response
was mostly handled by local responders from the Oso
Fire Station, the County Fire District 21, the Darrington Fire Station, State Troopers, the Arlington police,
and the County Helicopter Rescue Team, the Regional type-3 team took over the incident command
on day 2. The type-3 team was followed by the first
of two State type-2 teams beginning on day 6 (Thursday, March 27, 2014). These gradual shifts from
lower to higher-level and higher-capability response
teams also demonstrate the growing situational
awareness regarding the magnitude of the incident.
The timing of the shifts shows the enormity of the
incident was better understood no sooner than
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Wednesday night, March 26, 2014). However, the
handovers between teams also resulted in some friction and loss of situation detail knowledge. As an interviewee said:
The communication after that between the
EOC and the IMT and the group out here
working and the little satellite places like this
fire department and Darrington Fire Department and Arlington Fire Department...
Communication between all these entities got
a little fuzzy in there. And there’s where the
email chain got lost.
Another responder added,
And towards the end, I think we had a much
clearer view of “This is what we’re going to
need, <and> this <is> what the next…six
weeks is going to look like.” And we could
start seeing that. But on day six, you didn’t
have that.
In summary, responders understood the enormity
of the landslide only gradually, that is, situational
awareness was established only slowly. This can be
attributed to operating from an incorrect mental
model (local mudslide) and the initial lack of systematically collecting and sharing essential elements of
information, which hampered the establishment of a
shared common operating picture, which in turn
complicated the coordination of response efforts.
With increasing understanding of the enormity of the
incident at hand, higher capability response teams
were activated and deployed. However, the handovers from lower-level incident management teams to
higher-level teams also led to loss of information detail.

5.2 Ad research question #2 (information sharing challenges):
Sharing essential elements of information (EEI)
among response units regarding the incident at hand,
particularly, synchronously and in real time, is key to
developing a comprehensive shared SA/COP and a
coordinated response. For this to happen the incident
management team (IMT) at the incident command
post (ICP) along with the cognizant jurisdiction’s
supporting emergency operations center (EOC) need
to have a clear understanding of the essential elements of information relative to the incident. The
larger an incident or disaster, the more parties are involved in providing inputs to EEI and receiving EEI
outputs, which in turn help generate a shared SA and
COP.
As it turned out, before the massive landslide the
local responders had few, if any, detailed and coordinated plans in place for a disaster of this kind and

magnitude, nor were they prepared for systematically
collecting EEI inputs and disseminating EEI outputs
to response units and other important stakeholders.
Initially, information was rather unsystematically collected and disseminated. A local responder put it this
way,
When T. <the first incident commander on
day 1 - insertion by authors> got there we
started setting up some incident joint command with the state patrol and the sheriff's
office and fire. We split a few frequencies off
the main channel so we could talk separately.
So there were some incident command stuff
that was happening, but as far as training on
what to do out there, it was like kids out in
the mud puddle. There was just nothing. Initially we just blindly went out there and tried
to find the people…
When the WA State EMD and FEMA Region X
support teams along with mutual aid teams from the
region among others began to provide organizational
assistance, the information situation improved.
Interviewees reported on several barriers and impediments that made it difficult to collect, integrate,
and share EEI as quickly as desired:
Technical barriers: The infrastructure for information sharing such as file systems, email distribution lists, logistics systems, and networking arrangements was heterogeneous to an extent, which made it
impossible to easily, timely, and comprehensively
share documents and messages among responders
with a need to know. Furthermore, media breaks in
the form of concurrently circulated, but not integrated
paper documents, emails, and electronic documents
led to an incomplete and distorted operating picture.
But even electronic media could not readily be exchanged for the lack of an integrated secure interoperability platform for vertical exchanges among responders of different levels of government and for
horizontal exchanges among responders from different agencies. For example, according to one FEMA
interviewee,
Our systems have never, at least for as long
as I’ve been here, never been interoperable
with other systems. Our WebEOC does not
talk to the State’s WebEOC and vice versa.
And that’s the way it’s always been. The
FEMA firewall’s always been an issue, and
we know that, so we don’t try to solve it because we can’t. So we email stuff, basically.
Organizational barriers: While technical barriers
contributed their part to the overall difficulties of in-
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formation sharing and coordinated incident action
planning (IAP), organizational weaknesses also
posed additional barriers in this regard. Standards for
inter-responder information sharing and messaging
were missing so that completeness and timeliness of
information provision was questionable. This was in
part due to unclear responsibilities regarding not only
what were the respective EEI, but also who would
collect them, and with whom these were then to be
shared, and when. As one responder observed,
I think the next one was organizational, in
that there was never, certainly in the first 48
to 72 hours, I don’t think there was ever a
clear delegation of authority. So that, I don’t
know that there was ever clarity of the ... In
many ways, the operations was operating at a
different level or a different tempo than the
oversight and the planning.
While relatively early into the incident response
conference calls were held and situation reports (sitreps) were compiled and circulated at various levels
on a daily and half-daily basis, in the earlier phase of
response despite the availability of better information
the sitreps were incomplete due to the lack of sufficient integration of information from available
sources.
The aforementioned media breaks along with unrecorded face-to-face communications added to the
lack of information integration. No procedure was in
place, which would track information flows and information utilization with regard to respective actions
taken. Said one local responder,
I was overwhelmed and I didn’t even know it.
I didn’t feel like I was overwhelmed. I didn’t
feel that world spinning, adrenaline rush out
of control. But didn’t recognize that I was
overwhelmed until days later when I listened
to the radio tape. I was like, “Oh my god, I
missed some calls. I missed a lot of things” I
started to think about some of the things I had
written down.
Other barriers, which were both technical and
organizational in nature, include the difficulty of
scaling information acquisition, dissemination, and
utilization processes in an ever more complex response environment, in which finally over 100 government agencies of all levels became involved.
Moreover, information access regulations and related
protocols made it difficult to share information between teams, for example, between FEMA, State,
County, and the IMT. As one responder pointed out,

It’s sensitive information, and so there are
rules and protocols for how that information
can be shared.
This led to some unique arrangements, which
another responder described like this,
They worked out ways to transfer that information, which was laborious, physically getting an encrypted hard drive, giving that to
the ICP, so they could put their data on that,
and then driving to Arlington to get that, and
then driving that back.
In summary, technical and organizational barriers
played a major role in hampering effective information sharing among responders of various levels. As a
result, SA and a shared COP were slowly established,
and as a consequence incident action planning was
sub-optimally coordinated between responder teams.

5.3 Ad research question #3 (other challenges
including information flow challenges):
As already presented the lack of standards for information sharing and messaging slowed down the
flow of information among and between responders.
However, other challenges included the mix and operations of synchronous (for example, face-to-face,
via cell phone, satellite phone, landline, conference
calls, or radio) and asynchronous communication (for
example, email or postings).
Synchronous Communication. Radio communication has remained the most important tool for coordinating and messaging among responder teams. This
was not any different in the Oso/SR530 landslide response. Initially, however, many teams found themselves with incompatible radios and radio frequencies, which needed updating and patching in order to
communicate. Since in the first few days also cell
phone connections were weak or spotty, while the
fiber cable between the Arlington and Darrington
sites was cut by the slide, workarounds had to be implemented in order to enable synchronous communication. FEMA and mutual-aid partners were able to
overcome these technical difficulties relatively
quickly. However, whereas synchronous communication is indispensable and critically important in disaster response management, important information exchanged in synchronous mode is often not documented and shared with other responders who have a
need to know, which might hamper the information
flow to and from those responders not directly involved in the synchronous exchange.
Mostly, everybody uses their own personal
cell phones. We have found that to be the best
way, you know, you’re just talking. The prob-
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lem with that, I will say, is, with the three-day
turnover, then that’s the contact that you had,
whoever they were, and then they were gone.
Face-to-face communication was essential; however, the communicated information could easily
be lost, whenever staff turned over and the respective information had remained unrecorded.
Another responder remarked in this context,
In general, information got shared every
couple hours when there were debriefs. It was
still pretty chaotic. I’ll just speak for me.
When there was something specific for me, I
would go out and talk to the people in the
field do get a better handle on it.
In other words, spoken and written information
was insufficiently integrated, or incompletely
recorded, so that responders had to double-check
before action could be taken.
Asynchronous Communication. Email, texting,
and postings were widely and frequently used during
the Oso/SR530 landslide response. Also, print documents were circulated. The known crux with asynchronous communication is (a) the missing acknowledgement from the receiving side and (b) the undetermined consequence and action resulting from the
input. Cases were reported that requests and important information shared via email or postings had remained unattended, and no action was taken demonstrating the weakness of this particular way of communication in mostly time-critical disaster management. One responder was very clear about this,
Your email is not a form of communication,
it's actually a way to share some information,
but if you actually need to communicate with
somebody, you may send them an email, and
then you should pick up the phone and say
'Hey, I know this sounds odd, but I sent you
this email, it's got some information in it, I
need you to look at it and we can either talk
while you're looking at it, or you need to call
me back.
Geographical Obstacles. While the Western (Arlington) side of the landslide was easily accessible for
arriving response teams, the Eastern (Darrington)
side was literally cut off when the State Route 530
had been covered by a thick and wide layer of debris,
which for months would effectively isolate the uppervalley communities from easy access to supplies and
services. Interestingly, also in the management of at
least the initial response the Darrington side was not
as integrated as the Arlington side, which became
visible, for example, in an imbalance of resource al-

locations favoring the Western side. The Darrington
side also had a relatively weak information infrastructure with slow network connections making it
difficult for the incident command post located in Arlington and the County EOC in Everett to communicate with the Eastern side. As a result, information
flows between the three sides were relatively slow,
and IAPs were initially relatively loosely coordinated. One interviewee remembered,
There was very limited reporting. There were
only two situation reports, I think, going out
on a day, and they changed very little. When I
developed a written donations plan and
status, and had included a list of the contacts,
I asked them where I should house it. They
said, “Just keep it.” It’s like, well, that
doesn’t work. You know, nobody knows about
it. There was no place to put it. So I emailed
it to the planning unit, but they did nothing
with it, to my knowledge. And I emailed it out
to a bunch of other people, too. Same thing
with reunification for personal belongings.
Similarly, the USAR team operating on the Eastern side of the debris field also complained about a
lack of planning and cooperation on part of the
County (in terms of mass fatality handling) and a lack
of coordination on part of the IMT at Arlington,
which led the USAR team to skipping protocol and
making their own decentralized decisions and IAPs.
Said one response leader,
In this incident, the medical examiner never
showed up, so all investigation was handled
by the task force, all documentation was handled by the task force, and we did a great job.
I’m very proud of the job that was done. But
that’s not what we normally do. Normally we
find them, extract them, you know, to a place
that ... even before we extract them there’s
somebody documenting it. But in this case,
there was none of that. We handled it, and
then, in addition, we handled all the protocol
for how were we going to move them in the
presence of family, in the presence of relatives, and there were no policies that were established by command.
Local Community Involvement. Despite grief and
shock, local residents and family members were important sources of information guiding the search and
rescue operations. Local community members were
the first to accurately inform the arriving response
teams of the potential damage to life and property,
which prompted the ramping up of resources and
provided valuable information to the response teams
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on-site. The locals were also of important help when
locations of missing landmarks needed identification,
and when the best access points to the debris field
had to be determined. On the other hand, by involving family and community members in the response,
the responders provided a tremendous opportunity for
managing the community and families’ difficult emotional situation. When approached by enraged and
highly concerned family members, responders
calmed the situation by sharing their plan and offering a way to involve them as volunteers. As one responder reported saying,
This is our plan... If somebody is out there,
then we are going to find them, but this is the
procedure. You can either be part of it, or
you can go away, and if you don’t go away,
we can have the sheriff whisk you away. I
don’t want to push you away, I want you to
be involved, and here is the way you can be
involved, but you have got to cooperate. It totally changed their demeanor. We never had
any issues here. It was pretty amazing.
Working with the urban search and rescue teams
the volunteers had an opportunity to serve as effective sources of information.
In summary, other challenges to gaining and
maintaining SA and a shared COP leading to coordinated IAPs included the modes of information exchange (synchronous and asynchronous) along with
geographical obstacles. Involving locals, in contrast,
significantly helped responders on site understand the
situation and navigating the debris field.

6. Discussion
Situation Awareness According to the Endsley
Framework. The State Commission Report of December 2014 [20] claims that the “magnitude of the
SR530 Landslide was not fully comprehended for
several hours <emphasis by authors>” (p. 8). This
representation, however, is incorrect; it should rather
read “for several days.” When using the aforementioned Endsley framework of situational awareness
[9, 11] in this case, it is evident that basic level-1 SA
(knowing the basic facts) was reached no sooner than
day 4), whereas level-2 SA (comprehending the
situation) emerged around the time the first type-2
team was brought in on day 6, and level-3 SA (projecting and anticipating future developments) took
yet another few days, which became very clear
through the interviews, but which is also welldocumented and detailed in the FEMA Daily Operations Briefings in the first couple of weeks (see
htwww.disastercenter.com/FEMA+Daily+Ops+Briefi

ng+INSERT_DATE.pdf) after the landslide. The incorrect representation of SA/COP-related facts, however, unfortunately, leads to overlooking the seriousness of systemic problems unveiled in this study.
Ex-ante Planning for Collecting EEI. Given the
duration, scale and scope of the incident, one can
classify the Oso/SR530 landslide “massive” for a
small town, or “partial” for a small city, which would
make it a category-4 to -5 disaster according to
Fischer’s ten disaster categories [13]. It is noteworthy
that a disaster of a medium category can already be
highly demanding to local, State, and federal response efforts, not least of which in terms of shared
SA, shared COP, and coordinated IAPs. Snohomish
County and its municipalities were caught by this incident obviously flat-footed.
While the County Emergency Management Department with a FTE staff of fourteen had some plans
in place, it had no plans prepared for dealing with
massive landslides, and no hazard-specific EEI had
been developed, which would have helped coordinate
the various response teams and efforts more easily.
As the disaster response revealed, the County also did
not have a pre-coordinated plan for dealing with mass
fatalities. Also, the County EOC was not even fully
activated during the incident response and left without leadership, since the EMD director decided to involve himself at the ICP in Arlington, while simultaneously the Deputy EMD Director was deployed to
the Darrington side, which introduced additional confusion, coordination problems between IMT and
EOC, and added to the lack of both SA and COPbased coordination.
Furthermore, authority for carrying out response
efforts by other and high-capability partners appeared
to have been delegated in fairly limited and sort of
ambiguous ways. This had a direct detrimental influence on almost all aspects related to shared SA,
shared COP, and shared IAPs.
In other words, the level of preparedness on part
of the County for a disaster of this extent appears to
have room for improvement including the development of a sound understanding and practice of EMD
leadership roles during an unfolding disaster.
Missing Standards for Information Sharing. In the
United States, incidents are regularly managed on the
basis of structures and standards defined in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the
Incident Command System (ICS) at its core. ICS employs a hierarchical command-and-control structure
with clear responsibilities along with interfaces between various general staff sections (operations,
planning, logistics, and finance/administration) and
the command staff (public information, safety, and
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liaison). Incident management teams (IMTs) under
ICS work with local emergency operations centers
(EOCs), which coordinate resources and incident
support along fifteen emergency support functions
(ESFs). While the IMT under ICS is hierarchically
organized [5], which has been much criticized in the
academic literature for various reasons [2, 7, 28], the
EOCs on various levels provide essential capabilities
and resources, which make the whole response effort
function more like a hybrid or matrix organization
rather than a pure and simple hierarchical organization.
In an emergent complex organization like the
Oso/SR530 landslide response, which had numerous
ad-hoc elements and entities requiring coordination,
effective vertical and lateral flows of information are
of the essence. However, standards or unified protocols for information sharing and messaging appear to
be missing. Such content-related standards would, for
example, include but are not limited to the aforementioned hazard-specific templates for EEI, lists of EEIrelated information owners/providers, distribution
lists of responders and response support functions
with a need to know, and information distribution
tracking mechanisms.
Lack of Information Integration. In a complex
multi-agency incident response like the Oso/SR530
landslide response, information is collected, generated, and shared in various modes and formats. Information integration was missing due to various factors, for example, such as media breaks, that is,
pieces of information were recorded and shared on
paper, others were maintained electronically, and yet
others were communicated verbally; however, the
various pieces were not systematically put together,
which led to ambiguity and a distorted COP. Other
obstacles hampering information integration included
unclear information dissemination procedures and
frequent staff turnovers, which led to losses of important information.
Lack of information sharing and integration results in a phenomenon known as “siloing” [1]. Information silos emerge, whenever information is retained by individuals or not widely shared for a variety of different reasons mentioned above. Evidence
of siloing manifested in the interviews when respondents complained that information they needed existed, but was not accessible. It has to be noted that
information silos would not automatically be dissolved with the introduction of more advanced technology. Instead management practices and information architecture issues must be addressed to resolve
siloing.

In order to improve inter-unit information sharing
and coordination, various response units deployed
liaisons at other units who effectively helped with bidirectional information sharing and coordination.
However, the liaisons were able to only connect and
report bi-directionally what they noticed in their
given roles potentially missing important pieces of
information. In consequence, this important area of
information integration needs further study to be better understood.
Lack of a Unified Information Architecture and
System Platform. Response units used different systems such as SharePoint, WebEOC, Google Docs,
simple email, and traditional paper documents to record and organize their tasks and resource requests.
The IMT/ICP and the County EOC physically exchanged information once a day via an encrypted
hard disk, which was shipped back and forth between
the two sites. Moreover, while the County EOC used
SharePoint for sharing and storing documents, the
State EMD and FEMA region X utilized their respective versions of Intermedia’s WebEOC for task and
resource tracking. However, even between the FEMA
WebEOC and the State WebEOC data exchanges
were made impossible, since the systems were firewalled and shielded against access from and exchanges with the outside world. In contrast, the type2 IMT employed a low-tech approach using email,
paper documents, and the aforementioned encrypted
hard disk for information sharing, all of which would
not make information sharing timely and easy. A
similar multitude of approaches and platforms was
found also in the area of resource requesting, on
which the project team reports in a separate paper on
“managerial challenges.” In a nutshell, information
sharing and information processing among and between response units was rather cumbersome and
slow during the response, at least in the earlier stages.
As pointed out, the larger and the more dynamic
an incident the larger the ad-hoc matrix organization
handling the incident inevitably grows. While basic
interfaces underneath the NIMS/ICS and EOC/ESF
umbrellas are relatively well defined, it is surprising
that the most important enabler and potential facilitator of a complex matrix organization in an unfolding
incident, that is, a unified information architecture
and a corresponding information system platform has
remained undefined and non-standardized.
What might work well for a single-jurisdiction
EOC and a single IMT/ICP when responding to a
smaller scale/scope/duration incident, provided they
use the same information architecture and system
platform (for example, with WebEOC), appears to
not scale well at all, once an incident of larger scale,
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scope, and duration is at hand. In the aftermath of the
Oso/SR530 landslide, the State of Washington standardized its emergency-related resource request and
tracking procedures, also introducing standardized
forms. It appears that a similar approach to define
and devise a unified system architecture by standardizing secure information processing, information organization and record management, information sharing procedures, information system platforms, and
application program interfaces (APIs). As suggested
in the previous section, more research is needed also
in this particular area.
The Commission Report. In light of the findings
of this study, the State Commission Report [20] correctly points at major problems with gaining and
maintaining situational awareness, and it distinguishes four categories of infrastructure, interoperability, content, and strategy, into which these “issues” fall (p. 28). However, when analyzing the
causes, the report mostly refers to problems and failures in the physical and technological infrastructures
and their consequences for system interoperability.
Hence it misses to identify problems rooted much
more deeply and more widely, which this study unveiled. As a result, the Report downplays the severity
of the overall problem and simply concludes to recommend the implementation of better and more technology such as the proposed Federal initiative of
FirstNet (www.firstnet.gov/) and the use of drones
for better reconnaissance. While undoubtedly highspeed wireless digital data connections could greatly
improve information exchanges in disaster response,
the aforementioned deeper problems of lacking exante planning of EEI, lacking information integration,
and lacking a unified Information Architecture and
System Platform would still remain unaddressed.
Furthermore, using drones in a tight airspace while
simultaneously airborne operations were carried out
by helicopter search and rescue teams would have
introduced great safety risks and uncontrollable complexity for air control, which is why air operations
commanders turned down respective requests. However, immediate higher-altitude reconnaissance
flights, for example, by fixed-wing aircraft equipped
with high-resolution photographic and forwardlooking infrared radiometer (FLIR) capabilities might
have given a more comprehensive picture of the impacted area sooner.
In summary, problems of gaining and maintaining
shared SA and arriving at a shared COP leading to
coordinated IAPs encompass intertwined problems
related to planning, information sharing, information
integration, information architecture, and information
system platforms, which need further study. More

advanced technology alone will not resolve the identified problems.

7. Conclusions
It has been the object of this study to explore and
identify major problem areas of information management in disaster response, which hinder the rapidly development and maintenance of shared situational awareness and a shared common operating
picture. Responders’ diverse information needs, their
information behavior throughout various stages of
responding, and the respective information flows
have not been systematically identified.
In the course of the study, it was found that lack
in hazard-related planning hampered systematic information collection and sharing; also, the lack of
standardized information sharing procedures and information integration practices were found detrimental to gaining and maintaining shared SA/COP. Furthermore, the absence of a unified information architecture and information system platform further exacerbates the information “siloing” problem. This
study strongly suggests that further study in these
particular areas is necessary. In parallel, the project
team also studied related “managerial challenges” in
the Oso/SR530 landslide response, which are published in a separate paper.
This study reports on the response in the single
case of the 2014 Oso/SR530 landslide. A study of a
single case inherently introduces certain limitations
with regard to the transferability of results. However,
while this particular disaster ranks in the medium
section of the Fischer Disaster Scale [13], the observed complexities in the response, nevertheless,
provide ample evidence of SA/COP-related problems
to be systemic.
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